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Abstract: Focusing on energy developments and energy infrastructure in Moroccan-
occupied Western Sahara, this article engages with the politics of energy and energy cit-
izenship in situations of conflict, authoritarianism and settler colonialism. We contribute
to the body of research on how energy infrastructure, including renewable energy
infrastructure, furthers (neo)colonial social and political power imbalances. Using
Dominic Boyer’s concept of energopower, which allows us to explore how energy is
used to govern populations and produce subjectivities, we argue that a colonial and
oppressive energoregime will produce subjects hostile to itself. Putting colonised peo-
ple’s lived experiences and perceptions of an oppressive energy system centre stage, we
further research on the interrelationship between energy infrastructure, citizenship and
identity by showing how an energoregime can inadvertently foster a rejection of certain
citizenships and national identities in favour of others. Our data are generated using
ethnography and semi-structured interviews with Saharawis living in Moroccan-
occupied Western Sahara.
Keywords: Western Sahara, energopower, citizenship, renewable energy, energy colo-
nialism
This article engages with the politics of energy in situations of conflict, authoritari-
anism and settler colonialism. While there is a body of research on how energy
infrastructure, including renewable energy infrastructure, furthers (neo)colonial
social and political power imbalances, there is little work on how colonised peo-
ples subjectively perceive and experience such energy systems. As Loloum et al.
(2021) point out, indigenous voices are often missing in energy debates. We fur-
ther discussions on energy systems, colonisation and authoritarianism by focusing
on the lived experiences and perceptions of the colonised Saharawi people
towards the energy systems installed in their country, Western Sahara, which is
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largely occupied and ruled by a foreign power, Morocco. We argue that, in such
a situation of foreign military occupation, in which energy infrastructure is inextri-
cably tangled with a colonial political regime, the energy system, or ener-
goregime, produces subjects hostile to itself.
Western Sahara was a Spanish colony until 1975, when Spain sold it to neigh-
bouring Morocco and Mauritania in return for continued access to the country’s
fisheries and a share of profits from the phosphates mine. Morocco claimed that,
before Spanish colonisation, “Spanish Sahara” had belonged to the Kingdom of
Morocco, a claim refuted by Saharawis and, in 1975, by the International Court
of Justice. As Moroccan troops invaded, indigenous Saharawi civilians fled to refu-
gee camps in neighbouring Algeria, where the Saharawi liberation movement the
Polisario Front set up a state-in-exile, the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic.
Some 180,000 Saharawi refugees remain there today.
Saharawis that could not flee in 1975 have spent the last 45 years under a
Moroccan occupation. Human rights NGOs consider the occupied zone as among
the worst places in the world in terms of political freedoms. Saharawis there are
separated from Saharawis in the refugee camps by a Moroccan-built berm, which
is the longest active military wall in the world. Polisario and Morocco were at war
until 1991, when the UN brokered a ceasefire, promising a referendum on inde-
pendence for the Saharawis. Morocco has blocked the referendum ever since and
has meanwhile profited from Western Sahara’s immense natural resources, includ-
ing phosphates, fisheries, sand, agricultural products, renewable energy and oil
exploration contracts. Polisario have repeatedly asked the UN to intervene to stop
Morocco’s exploitation of Western Sahara’s resources. A 2002 UN Legal Opinion
found that such exploitation without the consent of the Saharawis is illegal. Over
the last five years, the High Court of England and Wales, the EU’s Court of Justice
in four separate rulings, and South Africa’s High Court, have drawn the same con-
clusion as the UN.
Research on natural resource exploitation in Western Sahara (see especially
Kingsbury 2015) and Saharawis themselves have long warned that continued
exploitation would result in an end to the ceasefire. On 13 November 2020, these
warnings proved valid: war resumed between Polisario and Morocco when the
latter’s army fired on Saharawi peaceful protesters on the Polisario-controlled side
of the military wall, in a demilitarised buffer zone near Western Sahara’s border
with Mauritania. The Saharawi protesters had been resisting the export of “their”
natural resources by mounting a roadblock. Energy, including renewable energy,
deserves special consideration among the resources that have contributed to the
antagonisms that have led to renewed war in Western Sahara. This is because
energy exploitation bolsters the occupation in a way other types of resource
exploitation does not: energy infrastructure (in the form of cables, distribution
lines, submarine cables and so on) creates material links between Morocco, Wes-
tern Sahara and other countries beyond; and (lack of) domestic energy affects
Saharawi lives on an everyday basis.
Below, we first situate our research in the relevant literature and outline our
methodology. Then, in three layers of analysis (international, local and personal),
we argue that an oppressive, colonial energoregime will produce subjects hostile
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to itself. Our second section is largely narrative, setting out for the reader the glo-
bal energy landscape that extends from occupied Western Sahara. The remaining
two sections draw on our fieldwork, showcasing Saharawi perceptions of the ener-
goregime, their attempts to resist it, and the forms by which Saharawis come to
be hostile towards it. Said perceptions are central to evidencing our argument
concerning the relationship between subjectivities and the energoregime. These
sections therefore rely on long quotations from interviews and ethnographic
descriptions. The third section focuses on how the energoregime antagonises
Saharawis at a local level, through unequal energy distribution, orchestrated
power cuts and discrimination. The fourth section focuses on antagonisms created
through the (threat of) violent oppression of Saharawis at an interpersonal level.
Researching Energy, Power, and Colonialism
Recent scholarship on energy and power highlights how energy mediates politics
and power relations globally (see especially Luque-Ayala and Silver 2016). While
in some contexts social movements push for emancipatory energy transitions
(Angel 2017, 2021), there is a large body of research on less than progressive
uses of energy infrastructure. Using the case of Mozambique, Kirshner et al.
(2020) highlight how perceptions of energy landscapes reflect social relations of
domination. Several scholars focusing on African cases argue that energy infras-
tructure is wielded by states to extend control over their populations, including
by enlisting the latter in citizenship (Brew-Hammond 2010). Winther and Wilhite
(2015) have argued that grid extension in rural Zanzibar provided the state with
a mechanism for extending political control over the population. Using the case
of Mozambique, Power and Kirshner (2019:504) understand electrical technolo-
gies and infrastructure as “political terrain”. They argue that large scale electrical
infrastructural developments are a way for the state to perform and narrate its
own presence, as well as to enlist a state’s citizens in projects of modernisation
and development. More specifically, Power and Kirshner argue that electrification
allows the state to enrol its citizens as bill-paying customers of neoliberal capitalist
development. Lemanski’s (2020) work on infrastructural citizenship finds that citi-
zenship and identity are embedded in infrastructure, and that public infrastructure
is a local representative of the state. Likewise, Baptista (2016) asserts that users’
everyday interactions with electrical infrastructure elicits their critical positionality
with regards to the state and thus to their condition as citizens.
Other studies focusing on Global Southern contexts highlight the colonial impli-
cations of such power politics. For example, Charis Enns and Brock Bersaglio
(2020) argue that large infrastructure projects in East Africa are reproducing colo-
nial legacies. Similarly, Power et al. (2016) argue that socially and spatially uneven
energy infrastructural developments in Mozambique and South Africa are at risk
of perpetuating a colonial electrical geography, given that they favour corporate
and elite clients over households and communities. Energy developments are also
contributing to settler colonial conflicts in settings as diverse as Mexico and occu-
pied Palestine (Dunlap 2019; Howe and Boyer 2015; Jabary Salamanca 2011).
Oppressive Energopolitics in Africa’s Last Colony 3
ª 2021 The Authors. Antipode published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Antipode Foundation Ltd.
This Mexican case, in which corporate-led renewable energy developments
encroach on indigenous communities’ lives and land, highlights that so-called
green energy is not always “clean” when it comes to human rights (Dunlap
2019). From the mining of rare earth materials for solar panels (Klinger 2017),
livelihoods endangered by wind farms (Franquesa 2018), landgrabs to make way
for biofuel plantations (Fairhead et al. 2013), climate change “solutions” too often
rely on dispossession and violence, which Meredith DeBoom (2021) conceptu-
alises as “climate necropolitics”.
Our article builds on this literature on the colonial and state-led power politics
of energy systems, but focuses on an area that has received less attention: how
the colonised population experiences and perceives the energy system, and how
this in turn influences their positionality towards it. We find the concept of an
energoregime useful in pursuing such lines of thought. Boyer’s (2017:197) con-
cept of energopower is “an alternative genealogy of modern power” that “re-
thinks political power through the twin analytics of electricity and fuel”. Just as
Foucault’s biopower is a productive force for subjugating bodies and controlling
populations, an energopolitical analysis goes beyond the study of energy politics
to explore how energy, fuel and electricity (are used to) govern populations and
produce subjectivities. Rogers (2014) conceptualises an energopolitical regime as
a political system in which energy companies join state agencies in moulding and
transforming citizens. We explore how Saharawis experience the Moroccan ener-
gopolitical regime in their territory and, following Mitchell’s (2013) lead in show-
ing how social movements take advantage of the vulnerabilities of energy
systems, demonstrate how the energopolitical regime inadvertently fosters a
Saharawi nationalist conscience. Foucault (1978) argues that resistance is not
exterior to power, that power and resistance are mutually constitutive. Applied to
an energopolitical regime, and as Mitchell has argued, the flows, cables and
pylons of electricity mediate power but also opportunities for resistance. Mitchell
argues that fuel, specifically coal, offered political agency not due to subjective
class consciousness or collective ideology but through the threat of sabotage and
strike. With the turn to oil as a fuel, which required less workers and whose infras-
tructure was not as vulnerable to sabotage, opportunities for workers’ agency dis-
appeared. Saharawis, victims of labour market discrimination and a minority in
their own country, likewise lack the tools of historic coal workers. Why and how,
then, do they resist? We argue that colonial, oppressive energopolitical regimes
foster antagonistic subjectivities that wish to resist the regime.
As well as arguing that Saharawis perceive the energy system as oppressive and
colonial, we have also ourselves qualified the energoregime in occupied Western
Sahara as “oppressive” and “colonial”. In the first section of our paper we justify
our qualification of the energoregime as “colonial”. Our qualification of “oppres-
sive” is justified throughout the article, although we define the term “oppression”
here. Community psychologists find that oppression ensures “that the distribution
of resources is unfairly allocated” (Palmer et al. 2019). Oppression also necessi-
tates the existence of a privileged group, argues Cudd (2005:21). That is, another
social group must privilege from the harm done to the oppressed group. Mar-
quez (2016:234) suggests an authoritarian oppressive regime “is capable of
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heinous actions, including torturing and killing”. Zafirovski (2007:137) identifies
an authoritarian, oppressive regime with “military-style discipline, brutality, and
cruelty”. While we are able to show, in our first section, that the oppression of
one group brings privileges to another, demonstrating “brutality” or “cruelty” is
more subjective. At the end of our third section, then, we make use of the ethno-
graphic method of thick description in order to give the reader a sense of the cru-
elty, and climate of brutal violence, faced by Saharawis.
We follow an ethnographic methodology, coupled with the use of unstructured
interviews. This allows us to focus on Saharawi perceptions of energy (regimes).
Precisely by putting Saharawis’ experiences and perceptions at the forefront, it is
possible to see how a particular energopolitical regime produces certain subjectivi-
ties. Interviewees have been anonymised, including by changing their names in
this text. This research is informed by a limited period of participant observation
in occupied Western Sahara, August to September 2014, by Joanna Allan. The
entirety of the fieldwork was conducted in “hiding” in one Saharawi household,
which Moroccan police had under surveillance 24 hours a day. The ethical impli-
cations of this research are vast, complicated and deserving of in-depth discus-
sion, which are discussed elsewhere (Allan 2017). The research is also based on
Hamza Lakhal’s, a Saharawi poet and researcher living in the occupied zone, and
Mahmoud Lemaadel’s, a Saharawi journalist and media activist, experiences of
lifetimes facing the violence, risked and actual, of the Moroccan regime. Allan’s
experience as a volunteer with Western Sahara Resource Watch, which protests
the illegal exploitation of Western Sahara’s resources, has also informed this
paper. The authors conducted 20 in-depth, semi-structured interviews and one
focus group with Saharawis living in the occupied territory between 2018 and
2020.
The Energopolitical Regime’s Exterior Ministry: Energy
Colonialism, Diplomacy, and Foreign Corporate Allies
In 2015, British/Irish San Leon became the first company to drill for oil onshore
Western Sahara. Oil companies have not (yet) found oil in commercial quantities.
Since fossil fuels elude Morocco, the Kingdom is almost completely dependent on
energy imports from Spain and Algeria. Morocco plans to achieve its much-
desired energy self-sufficiency via renewable energy. It makes itself—and we wish
to draw attention to the reflexive verb here—dependent on occupied Western
Sahara. This reflects similar situations in other colonial contexts, for example,
Gaza’s ties to Israel via electrical and water infrastructure (Jabary Salamanca
2011). However, while Israel forces Gaza’s dependence on itself through infras-
tructural violence, Morocco makes itself partially dependent on Western Sahara.
Below, we analyse why Morocco orchestrates this dependence. We also explore
the exterior links of the energopolitical regime in Western Sahara. We argue that
energy does Morocco’s diplomatic work and furthers Moroccan colonialism in
Western Sahara in material and imaginary ways. In this way, (renewable) energy
infrastructure in occupied Western Sahara is comparable to other large
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infrastructural projects in Africa in which, as Enns and Bersaglio (2020) argue,
reproduce colonial legacies.
Western Sahara is connected to the Moroccan grid via an interconnection in
the capital El Aaiun. A 400kv power interconnection between El Aaiun and Dakhla
city (also in Western Sahara) is in progress (RES4MED 2018:4). Morocco hopes
that its grid will connect to the Mauritanian one via Dakhla city (ONEE 2016).
Through this envisaged powerline, Morocco plans to export renewable energy to
West Africa. Exports to the European Internal Market (a Roadmap to this end was
signed at COP22) will travel via existing and planned submarine connections with
Spain, Portugal and possibly with the UK. The latter would see a 3GW submarine
cable between the UK and “the Sahara”, which would generate energy to meet
6% of the UK’s demand (Boulakhbar et al. 2020:8). The implications for the
Saharawis’ right to self-determination are huge. Aside from the financial benefits
for Morocco, these planned energy exports would make not only Morocco, but
also the European and West African energy markets partially dependent on energy
generated in occupied Western Sahara. This manufactured dependence is politi-
cally charged. Following Klinger’s (2017) observation on the power implications
of rare earth mining, energy developments in occupied Western Sahara are about
more than producing energy. They stake a colonial claim on a contested land
and implicate foreign powers in this claim. That is, the Moroccan regime uses
energy to recruit allies for its colonial project.
With regards to the Mauritanian connection, this would provide access to the
African market (Boulakhbar et al. 2020:8). Energy is at the heart of Morocco’s
wider foreign policy in Africa. Morocco joined the African Union in 2017. The
kingdom now seeks to augment its role in the African arena and uses the promise
of energy as soft power (Bennis 2019; North Africa Post 2019). Morocco has
modelled itself as “the African leader in the development of renewable energy in
Africa” (Ngounou 2018). Simultaneously, it is planning a Nigeria-Morocco gas
pipeline, which would connect all countries of the West African coast with Nige-
rian gas. This has softened Nigeria’s pro-Polisario stance (North Africa Post 2019).
ONEE, the Moroccan state’s electricity and water company, has provided techni-
cal assistance and expertise for electrical infrastructure projects in Senegal, Gam-
bia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Conakry, Cape Verde, Chad and Mali (ONEE 2016:2–3).
Morocco’s publication launched at COP22, “ONEE au Maroc et en Afrique”,
underlines the place of energy in realising the Kingdom’s diplomatic efforts in
securing support for its occupation in traditionally pro-Saharawi independence,
pro-Polisario, sub-Saharan Africa (ONEE 2016). While the most widely-used defini-
tion of “energy diplomacy” is the use, by exporters, of foreign policy to secure
energy markets abroad (Goldthau 2010), what we see in Morocco’s case is the
promise of future contributions to neighbouring regions’ energy supply in return
for recognition of its illegal occupation.
Renewable energy also does diplomatic work in support of Morocco’s illegal
occupation well beyond those countries who will benefit from energy exports.
Morocco is routinely celebrated as a pioneer in the green energy transition. Fer-
nandez Camporro (forthcoming) argues that King Mohammed VI uses renewable
energy developments to greenwash his military occupation of Western Sahara on
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the world stage. In international relations terms, Morocco’s investments in renew-
able energy give the Kingdom a source of “soft power” allowing it to move closer
to becoming a global player (Nye 2013). Whether energy in occupied Western
Sahara is produced from renewable sources or fossil fuels makes little difference to
the overall coloniality and oppressive nature of the energoregime. However,
renewable energy has the advantage of casting a favourable light on Morocco
due to the power of greenwashing discourses (Dunlap 2019; Fairhead et al.
2013).
By 2030, Morocco aims to source 52% of its energy from renewable sources
through the Moroccan Solar Plan and the Morocco Integrated Wind Energy Pro-
gramme (ONEE 2016:5). Solar plants in occupied Western Sahara will provide
30% of the total envisaged capacity of the Moroccan Solar Plan (WSRW
2016:23). Two wind farms in Western Sahara will provide half of the Wind Pro-
gramme’s projected capacity (WSRW 2020b). The territory is currently being sur-
veyed in terms of its potential for generating geothermal energy (WSRW 2020a).
Of five wind farms in occupied Western Sahara, four belong to the portfolio of
the Moroccan King’s energy company NAREVA, including the 50W Foum el Oued
farm. Much like the ironic case of windfarms powering the highly contested (by
the local population) Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant in India (Kaur 2021:31),
the Foum el Oued farm currently provides 100% of the energy needed to power
the neighbouring Fosbucraa mine (OCP Group 2020:119), a key source of phos-
phates globally. The existing Aftissat wind farm is also used for industry. What we
see, then, is a favouring of corporate clients in terms of energy provided by exist-
ing windfarms, as is also the case with large energy developments in Mozambique
and South Africa (Power et al. 2016). Of solar infrastructure, the newest planned
addition (to two existing sites) at the time of writing will be in Dakhla. The farm
will be built adjacent to industrial greenhouses owned by the King, members of
the makhzen, and French conglomerates (Africa Intelligence 2020). These green-
houses are responsible for draining underwater wells (vital for Saharawi nomads)
on a huge scale.
As Raquel Ojeda Garcıa and Angela Suarez Collado (2016) point out, Morocco
invests in public infrastructure in Western Sahara to give legitimacy to its occupa-
tion. Morocco fetches out the old European trope of justifying colonialism by way
of developing infrastructure for the helpless natives. A common refrain heard in
the kingdom is: Morocco is good, it develops its Southern Provinces. Foreign energy
companies replicate this narrative. There are hundreds of foreign businesses
involved in the exploitation of occupied Western Sahara’s natural resources. Some
are more deeply implicated than others. Saharawis’ corporate enemy number one
is arguably Siemens because it is involved in all five wind developments in occu-
pied Western Sahara. Siemens mirrors Morocco’s discourse, using the colonial
crutch of so-called development and modernity to excuse its activities. Says Sie-
mens (2020) on its official “Siemens in Morocco” (Siemens ignores the existence
of Western Sahara in its PR materials) web presence: “Morocco is getting ready
for the future. With an extensive sustainable development plan that will make the
country more energy self-reliant [sic]”. It goes on: “Siemens is helping Morocco
make the most of its own resources to produce, support and scale opportunities
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from wind and solar farms to manufacturing to the sustainable development of
vital infrastructure. That’s Ingenuity [sic] for life”.
Siemens’ infrastructure arms the cables of power that grab Western Sahara for
Morocco. As Jabary Salamanca (2011) highlights, energy grids play a crucial role
in the discursive construction of a territory because they link places both politically
and physically. Likewise, Siemens furthers Morocco’s colonisation of Western
Sahara in a material as well as discursive way. Thus, Moroccan energopolitics in
Western Sahara rely on foreign corporate allies. We have also seen that energy
plays a key diplomatic role for the Moroccan kingdom further illustrating how far
energy, politics and the Moroccan ruling regime are tangled up in one energopo-
litical regime. This can be considered as oppressive because it, one, harms the
Saharawi people by entrenching Moroccan military occupation on their land, and
it, two, privileges another group, the Moroccan kingdom.
Power Outages, Prohibitive Costs, and Energy Non-
Citizens
The power goes after dusk. Zrug and his wife stumble around the room grabbing
for the hands of their children, fearing an accident with the tea stove.1 Zrug care-
fully descends the staircase, squeezing the rail with one hand, holding the baby
in the other. He keeps matches, candles and an oil lamp near the front door. This
oil lamp “symbolises safety” for Zrug. Outside, his toddler clutches his mother’s
leg as other neighbours trickle out of their homes. They hold candles or oil lamps
or the torchlight of smart phones. Says Zrug, too often “we fall into a state of
chaos [when there’s a power outage after dark] that risks the lives of our kids”.
90 minutes later, down the road in Maatalla, the bulb ticks and the light flickers
in Safia’s living room. Safia sighs as the light comes back entirely. She heads to
the bathroom to fill water bottles. It won’t be long before the water cuts out
again. Her brother Ali lies on his side on the carpet: “These cuts are usual in Maa-
talla and the other Saharawi suburbs but you can bet the settlers still have their
showers”. He implies that the regular water and electricity cuts are a deliberate
form of collective punishment. We can understand this punishment as a gendered
one, as erratic electricity and water supplies add hugely to the domestic workload,
which belongs almost exclusively to women.2 Mahmoud—Safia and Ali’s father—
lives nearby. He too experiences “frequent” (monthly) power cuts, usually for six
hours or more each time. “As a nomad, these don’t affect me”; he is used to life
without electricity. But Mahmoud says the impact on his wife and the children
that still live with him is considerable.
Mahmoud is 78. As a young man, the Spanish colonial administration
employed him as a butcher. He hasn’t been able to get a job since the Spanish
left in 1975. Power cuts are “... frequent. They say they are due to problems in
the grid, but we know that they sometimes cut the power on purpose when they
want to bring secret things to the city, or when the young people protest in the
streets”. Fadel, a young political activist, sheds light on what Mahmoud may
mean by “secret things”. Says Fadel, blackouts coincide with Saharawi national
days, Saharawi demonstrations, and “sometimes they cut [the power] if they
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bring more soldiers and arms from the airport to the desert, to the berm, they
don’t want people or activists to know how many arms, tanks, and soldiers are
entering”. Hartan gives further insights:
... when there is a homecoming of Saharawi political detainees, Moroccan occupying
authorities intentionally cut [the power] off in order to screw up the event ... I was
personally able to see the suffering of media activists and this was when we were
trapped during popular demonstrations in conjunction with UN envoy Christoph Ross’
visit to occupied El Aaiun ... I noticed how their camera batteries had run out so they
couldn’t monitor the violations ...
Scholarship on energy and colonialism highlights the links between electricity,
unequal access, inequalities and discrimination (Chikowero 2007; Winther 2008).
With regards to settler colonialism, Jabary Salamanca (2011) argues that Israel
employs infrastructural violence in Gaza by controlling and sanctioning Palestinian
access to key infrastructure. Saharawis interpret a similar dynamic in occupied
Western Sahara, alleging that their community’s energy access is removed at Mor-
occo’s will, and often linked to pro-independence and/or anti-occupation activi-
ties. Morocco employs energopower to curtail performances of Saharawi
nationalism.
Interviewees insisted that the districts with the highest population of ethnic
Saharawis, Maatalla for example, are subject to more blackouts. Energy infrastruc-
ture mediates ethnic segregation. Electricity access has long been a tool for race-
based socio-spatial differentiation. In the American South for example, govern-
ments developed electrical infrastructure that would institutionalise white supre-
macy (Harrison 2016). This pattern was reflected in European colonies, where
white settlers had better access to infrastructural services (Baptista 2016:121).
Since invading Western Sahara, Morocco has embarked on the settler colonial
policy of moving its own population into Western Sahara. Moroccan settlers now
greatly outnumber indigenous Saharawis. Comments such as Ali’s above—“the
settlers still have their showers”—reveal that infrastructure is understood as a tool,
wielded by an oppressive colonial force, to differentiate the colonisers from “the
natives”.
Says Nguia: “At night, when the lights are out, violent confrontations erupt
between Moroccan police and civilians. Therefore, power outages cause trouble
for [the authorities]”. According to Nguia, then, the energy companies avoid
blackouts in order to avoid civil unrest. Dadi’s view contradicts Nguia’s. He finds
that power outages are an orchestrated consequence, rather than a cause, of
political unrest: “[a black out] happens for political reasons, for example because
of late-night demonstrations”. He recalls feeling “terrified” when, following
demonstrations across El Aaiun upon the visit of the UN Envoy, police began raid-
ing homes under the dark cover of a power outage. It is worth highlighting that
for Dadi, Nguia and others, there is little distinction between the energy compa-
nies and the Moroccan regime security authorities. As Baptista (2016) points out,
where a service provider is intimately associated with the state, the provider-user
relationship is often understood as a proxy for state-society relations. Saharawis
talk of energy providers and the Moroccan state’s security services as if they were
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one and the same: an energopolitical regime. Whether power outages happen to
avoid confrontations, to quell political unrest or to hide human rights abuses from
international observers, the energopolitical regime is understood as the agent
behind them.
62-year-old Salka describes herself as an activist for peace. She puts power cuts
in her home down to problems on the grid, or her inability to pay bills. She
spends 50–60% of her monthly income on electricity bills. Meeting the energy
and water bills is a great source of anxiety for her, and, she says, “for all Sahara-
wis”. When she fails to pay, the electricity is cut. She has also, on one occasion,
had her meter removed, as have both Mohammed and Omar. Omar explains
what happens if you fail to pay bills on time:
After sending warning letters, the water and electricity companies will cut you off and
taxes you double what you owe if you want to be reconnected. Then, if you still can’t
pay, they will remove your electric meter.
There was a general mistrust of suppliers on the part of interviewees. Several inter-
viewees say they were being mischarged. Says Mahmoud: “they sometimes send
us invoices with the wrong amounts. In our house we haven’t a lot of machines,
so we know how much energy we use”. Najem and Najla share an anecdote of a
time they spent away from home. Their usual monthly bill is 400-600 dirhams.
Yet they were sent a bill for 1,000 dirhams for the month that the house was
empty. They did not complain. Explained Najem: “we paid it because we can’t
do anything about this. Those who are in charge of bills in the electricity com-
pany are trying to steal money and there is no way to stop them”.
Without exception, all interviewees in houses connected to the grid found their
bills expensive. Of those interviewees that had a regular income, on average 30%
of it was spent on electricity. All interviewees knew of families, notably those living
in the slums of east El Aaiun, that did not have electricity in their homes. Several
also mentioned families with low incomes that managed to “poach” electricity.
Interviewees spoke of such families with no judgement. Eric Verdeil (2016:163–
165), in his work on illegal hook-ups in Beirut, conceptualises similar poaching by
Beirutis as a form of grid-embedded resistance at the “end of the line”. Verdeil
finds it is an individual rather than collective form of dissent that is not necessarily
connected to any wider political demands. Silver (2014) notes a similar practice
in poor areas of urban Accra. He conceptualises these practices as “clandestine
connections” and suggests they may be read as “the material articulation of a
future with lower tariffs or even free energy for marginalised communities, an
attempt by the neighbourhood not just to envisage but to actually bring about a
future of more equitable energy access” (Silver 2014:795). Silver, then, allows the
possibility to think of “illegal” hook ups as collective resistance, not just individual
dissent. Returning to Verdeil (2016), and following his reading of Asef Bayat, “ille-
gal” hook-ups show how the politics of Saharawi energy poverty are fought in
the “back alleyways” of the poorest neighbourhoods. But not only there. Town
squares, wide avenues and the city’s main thoroughfares have seen street protests
concerning the high cost of electricity and water, bringing dissent into the public
sphere. Explains Zrug:
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We are in 2019 and in a few days, we will be in 2020. I know many who do not have
electricity at home. A lot of companies have launched big projects of energy power
and, not far from these projects, people in El Aaiun are living without electricity ...
There was a protest in Al Matara neighbourhood concerning the energy and water
outages ...
We see that the high cost of electricity makes it an exclusive resource. But it
excludes poor Saharawis from more than just reliable energy access. Lemanski
(2020) argues that people’s everyday access to public infrastructure affects their
citizenship identities. Failing infrastructure therefore constitutes a breakdown in
state-citizen relationships. If we read energy infrastructure as a physical manifesta-
tion of (as Lemanski does with public infrastructure in the South African case)
Morocco’s citizenship model, then excluding Saharawis from energy access only
fosters their disassociation with the Moroccan state. While an energopolitical
regime seeks to govern population and shape subjectivities, the oppressive nature
of the energopolitical regime in Western Sahara produces subjects hostile to itself.
In other words, we suggest that the energopolitical regime has attempted to “de-
velop infrastructure in the Southern Provinces” to, at least outwardly (in reality,
infrastructural developments follow their traditional colonial purpose of facilitating
capitalist wealth-gathering and removal) serve Saharawis and integrate them into
the wider Moroccan nation by way of offering “development”, “modernisation”,
and “infrastructure” (we refer back to the aforementioned common refrain “Mor-
occo is good, it develops its Southern Provinces”) but has achieved the opposite.
As energy infrastructure removes the border between Western Sahara and Mor-
occo, it simultaneously bolsters the border between Morocco and the Saharawi
Republic in Saharawi hearts and minds.
The Visibility of the Energopolitical Regime and Bodily
Violence
Researchers working on perceptions of energy often comment that people do not
think about energy except during power outages (Chapman et al. 2013; Rupp
2013). Energy is mystified. People consume it in great quantities with no aware-
ness of its providence or how it reaches them. In this section, we join other schol-
ars working on African contexts such as Silver (2014) in finding that contrary to
the body of research that finds energy to be invisible until it is absent in the Glo-
bal North, in Western Sahara energy is “visible” to Saharawis in the sense that it
is perceived as a dangerous mediator of oppressive politics whether materially
present or absent. Saharawis living in occupied Western Sahara interpret energy—
its providence, its use, its cost in the widest sense of the word—in intensely politi-
cal ways. A power outage is not needed to provoke thought or debate about
energy. We argue that this is precisely because of the presence of an oppressive
energopolitical regime in occupied Western Sahara. To make this argument, we
below highlight Saharawi perceptions of energy infrastructure: who they believe is
behind energy infrastructure in occupied Western Sahara, the various political
meanings that energy infrastructure constitutes for Saharawis, and the (physical)
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oppression and violence they (believe they will) face if they dare to publicly ques-
tion the energopolitical regime. We continue with Zrug’s story.
Zrug’s case is exceptional because he is the only Saharawi that any of us have
met that has benefited from a job in the energy industry. Zrug is passionate
about looking after the environment. He is currently unemployed. Ideally, he
would make a living by working in the field of sustainable development. He has
so far been only partially successful in this aspiration: Zrug has worked for day
wages for a solar thermal company, but before that also for Geofizyka Krakow, a
Polish company providing seismic data on hydrocarbons. He describes his experi-
ences of working for energy companies as “exploitative”. He would work, on
average, 13 hours a day and says he was paid the equivalent of one euro an
hour.
Before these jobs, Zrug had thought that energy used in occupied Western
Sahara arrived from Morocco via transmission lines. But, through his work, he
saw solar installations in Dchiera village, near El Aaiun, wind turbines near Dora
and Tah villages, a wind farm outside Boujdour, and oil drilling near Bou Craa.
Now he knows that Western Sahara generates and exports energy. And he also
learnt who profited from his exploitation: “Energy is managed and owned by
multinational companies and individuals like the king of Morocco ... There are
multiple companies that generate energy in Western Sahara while we are paying
it from our wallets and this is nonsense”.
Although Zrug is at pains to emphasise that these renewable energy develop-
ments are illegal because the Polisario does not consent to them, energy poverty
is the most important factor for Zrug:
Wind farms and so on are making the poor poorer and the rich richer. Green energy
is being exported out of Western Sahara to other places in Africa and elsewhere.
Although this is illegal because it is done by the Moroccan occupation, I feel proud as
many elsewhere will be able to use electricity for lighting and other activities. They
need electricity, just as I do. I am in favour of benefits for people everywhere and I
can compromise my rights for them to produce light for poor people but under one
condition: it has to be for free and not for sale.
Zrug knows that his condition is not met. Even his own parents are not con-
nected to the grid. They rely on candles for light. His father is over 90 and Zrug
worries for them. Ironically, they live between the energy developments at
Dcheira village and the Siemens wind farm at Bou Craa phosphate mine.
Zrug’s indignation at the unequal distribution of energy wealth pushed him to
protest. A banner hangs from his house reading, “stop the plundering of Western
Sahara’s natural resources”. He also recently participated in a 52-day sit-in in
Mecca Street, El Aaiun, demanding jobs for Saharawis, and another lasting 29
days at the Guerguerat buffer zone (Saharawi civilians had intermittently been set-
ting up roadblocks and other forms of protest at Guerguerat since 2016, well
before the November 2020 outbreak of war, which occurred at Guerguerat). The
latter protested illegal exploitation of Saharawis’ natural resources. Zrug has since
ceased his protesting activities. After Guerguerat, he hustled some part-time work
as a bus driver. But, he says, Moroccan authorities got him sacked. He is also
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banned from travelling outside of Aaiun. Zrug fears for the wellbeing of his chil-
dren, wife and parents: “no one will feed them if [the authorities] take me”.
No interviewees had been invited to take part in any consultation process on
energy developments. All interviewees were likewise unanimous in their view that
these energy developments held no benefits for Saharawis and that the benefits
of natural resource exploitation go to Moroccans—mostly wealthy settlers and ex-
high-ranking military personnel and government members—and a small minority
of wealthy Saharawi families with close ties to the Moroccan authorities. This is
reflected in research that focuses on other areas of natural resource exploitation
(ODHE 2019). Energy infrastructure is understood as (and indeed is) funding the
patronage networks that maintain elite allegiance to the Moroccan occupation
and king.
Interviewees expressed positive views towards renewable energy in general, but
none had positive opinions of the renewable energy developments in occupied
Western Sahara. We asked if they knew who was responsible for the develop-
ments. Nguia believe it was a “foreign” company called Siemens, which has “no
humanity”. She adds, “the occupying power is letting other countries invest here
as a way of getting them to recognise Moroccan sovereignty over Western
Sahara”. Messbah expects that most developments would be the result of part-
nerships between French companies and the Moroccan king.
Hartan has heard of Kosmos Energy. Dadi, too, has heard that Kosmos is active
in the region, as well as San Leon. He opines, “these companies contribute to
Moroccan colonisation and endlessly support its presence”. Dadi, Hartan and
Ahmed collaborated to create news articles about an event held in El Aaiun on
the Noor 1 (Dchiera, near El Aaiun) solar project, to which Saharawis were not
invited. In retribution, Ahmed, who is a university student in Morocco, had his
study and travel grants pulled, and Moroccan authorities also cancelled social
benefits received by his relatives.
Salka knows about solar energy projects in El Aaiun port and Tarfaya, but she is
not aware of the names of any companies involved in these developments. She
comments: “All profits go to the Moroccan occupation and foreign companies”.
She has never publicly protested against these energy developments because she
is afraid of violent repression. Like Nguia, Omar and Mohammed voice their
desire to demonstrate against the energy companies present in their country but
they are too afraid to do so.
Mahjoub is a fisherman. He does not identify as an activist. He knows of solar
and wind farms at Tarfaya and El Aaiun port. He believes them to be owned by
the king, but knows that Siemens is also involved. Does Mahjoub like the look of
wind turbines? What do they represent for him aesthetically? Mahjoub giggles
and remarks, “They do not represent anything but a scene of the wind of your
land being illegally exploited by the invaders with no benefits for the people”.
As for Fadel, he comments: “I know Siemens and the Moroccan Royal Holding
and others, they support this occupation and give Morocco reasons to continue
the occupation”. He says he has participated in a peaceful protest against such
energy companies and was beaten by Moroccan authorities for doing so. Mah-
moud does not know what green energy is. He has seen a wind turbine though.
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He describes it as “a machine or tool made to steal our resources and say we ben-
efit from it”.
Zain is a student. He does not identify as an activist. He knows of wind farms at
Boujdour, Tarfaya and Dakhla, and of a solar thermal project at Dchiera. When
asked if he knows who manages these renewable energy developments, he
replies, in a whisper: “Can I say the word occupation?” When reassured, he goes
on to talk of four Saharawi families in Tarfaya (Tarfaya is in Morocco proper, but
was historically roamed by Saharawi nomads) whose land—Zain alleges—was
confiscated, with no compensation, to make way for the Siemens developments
there. WSRW has reported on one such family in Tarfaya (WSRW 2013), as well as
the case of an El Aaiun family who lost their home (and whose members were
beaten and arrested when they refused to leave the house) to make way for an
Alstom-constructed power line (WSRW 2014).
Salem does not see himself as an activist. He feels energy developments in
occupied Western Sahara cause his people suffering. He says, “the consultation
about such projects is always only with well-known individuals and they negotiate
deals. Ordinary people are not consulted”. In the past, Salem has emailed foreign
energy companies to urge them to divest from his country. He received no
replies. He also attended a demonstration against the solar developments, but
was beaten there by police.
Interviewees’ views of the developments and the developers was uniformly neg-
ative because they “fuel Moroccan colonialism and occupation”. That several
interviewees named the Moroccan king as behind energy developments is signifi-
cant given, following Baptista (2016), that where infrastructure is associated with
the state it is often understood as a proxy for state-society relations. That Sahara-
wis identified developers as “foreign multinationals” emphasises the perceived
coloniality of the energoregime. If we argued in the former section that energy
supply issues and prohibitively high energy costs foster an “othering” of Sahara-
wis and thereby a rejection, on their part, of Moroccan citizenship, in this section
we see that renewable energy developments are met with disdain largely on
Saharawi nationalist grounds: the developers and developments are colonial, they
further the occupation. The oppressive energopolitical regime fuels a Saharawi
identity, and with it, resistance. Beatings, job losses, benefits cuts, threats to rela-
tives and travel bans are the lot of those interviewees who have occasionally
denounced the hated foreign energy developers. This violence is indicative of a
situation of climate necropolitics (DeBoom 2021; Mbembe 2003): Saharawis face
violence in the name of climate change mitigation. We purposefully sought inter-
views with Saharawis that did not consider themselves activists, or who were low-
profile activists, in order to gage the views of “ordinary” Saharawis. If we turn,
though, to the retributions suffered by those who dedicate their lives to strug-
gling against resource plunder, we get a sense of the cruelty, degradation and
brutal violence that allow us to qualify (according to the definition explored at
the outset of this paper) the energopolitical regime in Western Sahara as one of
authoritarian oppression.
Sultana Khaya, President of the Saharawi League for Human Rights and Natural
Resources, has led several protests against specific energy companies, as well as in
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favour of Saharawi human rights. The Moroccan police’s punishment for her was
to remove one of her eyes (Allan 2016). To understand the fate of the president
of the other Saharawi organisation fighting plunder in the occupied territory, the
Committee for the Protection of Natural Resources in Western Sahara (CSPRON),
we should look back ten years.
On 25 December 2010, police pick up Sidahmed Lemjeyid and Izana Amidan
together. Izana is a high-profile human rights activist. Sidahmed, before his arrest,
had dedicated all his time to his role as President of CSPRON. This is an unofficial,
unpaid role, because Saharawi organisations that work to denounce activities such
as San Leon’s oil exploration surveys or Siemens wind farms are not allowed to
register or officially exist.
Allan (2019) writes elsewhere about what happened to Izana after her arrest. In
brief, police put her in a cell in a secret detention centre and subject her to sexual
violence and torture for three days before releasing her without charge. Sidahmed
is also put in a cell—he does not know where it is—and is tortured, raped and
made to sign a confession. The next day, his case is referred to Rabat’s military
court (Moe 2017:258). He spends the next three years being tortured in cells in
El Aaiun, Dakhla and Sale.3
In February 2013, Sidahmed stands up in court. He faces trial alongside 23 of
his compatriots on trumped up charges linked to the 2010 Gdeim Izik Saharawi
protest, which was a month-long encampment of 20,000 Saharawis demanding
jobs, independence and an end to natural resource plunder. Sidahmed wears a
blue derrah and hangs a green turban around his neck. Scars are visible on his
hands and head. Someone is taking photographs. He looks at the camera and
makes the peace sign. They all do. The defendants give their statements.
Sidahmed quotes, in his defence, the 2002 UN Legal Opinion on oil exploration
activities in Western Sahara:
... if further exploration and exploitation activities were to proceed in disregard of the
interests and wishes of the people of Western Sahara, they would be in violation of
the principles of international law applicable to mineral resource activities in Non-Self-
Governing Territories. (Corell 2002)
On sentencing day, there are power outages in El Aaiun. Saharawis say the
Moroccan authorities have arranged for the blackout. Without electricity, it will
take longer for the Saharawi community to learn the fates of their Gdeim Izik her-
oes, and it will be harder to coordinate large demonstrations. Slowly, the news
perforates the El Aaiun darkness: Sidahmed is sentenced to life imprisonment.
Three years on, Sidahmed and his compatriots are brought before Sale Civilian
Appeals Court. In the court room, they stand in a glass cage. The trial lasts seven
months. Some days, the defendants come in bloody, even wrapped in blankets.
They claim to have been tortured on court premises, including in the presence of
the judge. On days that they are unable to stand up, they must sit in an adjacent
room, where they cannot hear proceedings. On 21 March 2017, Sidahmed gives
his declaration. He mentions a phrase that he has been forced to utter whilst
being tortured. It’s a phrase that mocks his work: “Morocco is good, it develops
its Southern Provinces” (Moe 2017:258).
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On the last day, the court delivers the sentence in minutes (Moe 2017:34).
Sidahmed is sentenced to life imprisonment.
Conclusion
Engaging with Boyer’s concept of energopower as a means to discipline citizens
and foster subjectivities, this article has conceptualised the Moroccan energy sys-
tem in occupied Western Sahara as an oppressive, colonial energoregime. We
have furthered discussions on energy, politics, colonialism and citizenship by
focusing on indigenous voices and lived experiences, arguing that a colonial,
oppressive energoregime inadvertently produces citizens hostile to itself. Sahara-
wis living in the occupied territory are aware, eyes wide open, that energy infras-
tructure—its ownership, its management, its reach, the terms of its access, the
political and diplomatic work it does—mediates the power of the Moroccan occu-
pation and its corporate partners. The Moroccan occupation enters into, and
shapes the possibilities of, daily life in the Saharawi home through (the lack of)
electricity cables. Saharawis understand power cuts as a method through which
the occupying regime punishes them as a community, fosters ignorance of
Moroccan military manoeuvres, combats celebrations of Saharawi national iden-
tity, enforces a media blockade so that news from Western Sahara does not reach
“the outside world” and creates regular dangers in their family homes. Thousands
of Saharawis lack the funds to pay for grid energy. Some, through pirate hook-
ups, manage to opportunistically exploit vulnerable points in the grid to their
own advantage, which, following Verdeil (2016), can be read as individually-
voiced forms of redress or, following Silver (2014), can be understood as a collec-
tive call for free energy for the marginalised. With regards to those Saharawis
whose homes are connected to the grid legally, access does not mean liberal use.
Costs are prohibitively high, which has led to public protests. Discrimination
along ethnic lines, which means that jobs in the energy industry are almost exclu-
sively for Moroccan settlers, has also resulted in protests.
For Saharawis, energy justice is inextricably linked with self-determination.
Energy providers, closely linked to the Moroccan state and king, are (seen as) a
proxy for the Moroccan occupation in its entirety. Foreign energy developers are
despised because they are perceived as agents of colonialism and occupation.
Saharawis’ everyday engagements with energy mediate their critical positionality
vis-a-vis the Moroccan regime and their conditionality as an occupied people. If
we follow Baptista (2016) and Lemanski (2020) and read these interactions with
energy infrastructures as a mediator of citizenship, we can argue that the ener-
gopolitical regime fosters a rejection of Moroccan citizenship whilst simultane-
ously fuelling Saharawi nationalist demands. The oppressive nature of the
energopolitical regime produces resistance to itself.
For a Saharawi in the occupied territory, to contradict the logics of the ener-
gopolitical regime by protesting against the foreign energy companies that sup-
port and form it is to risk economic dispossession and bodily violence. For repeat
offenders like Sidahmed Lemjeyid, it also means life imprisonment. In the prison
cells, the energopolitical regime’s electricity flows through the tortured body.
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Endnotes
1 All first names indicate pseudonyms for interviewees.
2 Enloe (2010) has made this observation with regards to the situation of women living in
Iraq during the US invasion. For more on the gendered implications of infrastructural fail-
ures, see Lawhon et al. (2018).
3 The report by Associac~ao de Cooperac~ao e Solidariedade Entre os Povos (ACOSOP) is
published in Moe (2017:250–265).
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